

Blended spaces and performativity

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Abstract

Mental Spaces theory, with its sophisticated mechanisms for representing the contents of speech, thought, and perception, opens routes for the exploration of relations between these domains and the “real” world. One of the most intriguing of these relations is performativity, defined by Searle (1989) as the ability of some descriptions to bring about the described situations in reality. My broader definition of performativity treats it as mental-space blending (in Fauconnier and Turner’s terminology) wherein structure is transferred from a representing space to the space represented. Performative uses of metaphorical representations (pervasive in ritual and magic) are treated alongside literal cases, using our well-developed system for representing metaphor in terms of mental space blends. This approach offers a general treatment of the ways in which linguistic and non-linguistic representations (e.g., ritual enactments or pictures) are understood to affect reality.

Keywords: performativity; mental spaces; blended space; metaphor; ritual; magic.

1. Introduction: Linguistic and nonlinguistic performativity

When does representation bring about its own truth? Under the right circumstances, not only *With this ring I thee wed* but a simple *I do* can bring a marriage into existence.¹ Liability for perjury is caused by saying *I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth* in the right courtroom setting, since this statement constitutes an oath. And a jury’s *We find the accused not guilty* not only constitutes an act of “finding” or judgment, but also legally causes the defendant to have not-guilty status. In one sense, there is no “magic” about such facts: as far as I know, parallels prevail in a wide range of different cultures. Yet they

bear a fascinating resemblance to other nonlinguistic cases which have been treated very differently. I myself do not believe that my physical health can be causally influenced by manipulating a representation of me (e.g., a wax doll), but there are others who strongly believe that such a representation can have a causal link to its original, such that stabbing the doll might result in the death of its counterpart person.

Performativity is a term which has recently made its way from its philosophical and linguistic domains of origin to other fields such as anthropology and critical theory. The central sense of the word, and the one in which I shall be using it, refers to the phenomenon whereby an apparent *description* of a speech act “counts as” a *performance* of the relevant speech act: *I promise you that I’ll be there* sounds like a description of promising,² but can in fact constitute an act of promising to be there—unlike *You promise me that you’ll be there*. In interdisciplinary usage, performativity has a fascinating pattern of related senses (some of them barely recognizable to users of the “traditional” meanings), but the concepts it refers to are all aspects of the human ability to use representations to influence the world outside the representational system.³ It is my contention that setting linguistic performatives in this broader context can help us to understand them, and to decide what is and is not special about the performative uses of linguistic descriptions.

My basic argument will be that there are depictive and performative uses of many kinds of symbolic representations, linguistic and otherwise. The contrast between descriptive or depictive and performative is best understood as a contrast between two kinds of causal relationship between the representation and the represented space. In the depictive use of *I promise you that I’ll be there* (presumably a depiction of a habitual activity of promising), it seems evident that the description is judged by its conformity to the represented space: for example, one can ask whether it is a true or accurate description. In the performative use, however, as many scholars have noted,⁴ no such questions arise: instead, the described “real” world is shaped by the speech act, and the speaker has now made a promise. Let us compare these with examples from another domain, which will be analyzed more thoroughly later in the article. A Christian Western bride who wears a white wedding gown is considered by many to be making a (metaphorical) statement about her virginity or sexual purity; this statement is depictive, in that many wedding guests are apparently upset or offended if a divorced woman wears white at her second wedding. They consider that she is making a *false* or inaccurate representation of herself by wearing white. But a penitent, in Christian and Jewish traditions, puts on white to (metaphorically) represent spiritual purity, not as a description of his or her *actual* spiritual state, but as a causal aid to bringing about

a state of purity. A viewer could not appropriately say, *How can so-and-so put on white for Yom Kippur (or for an adult Christian baptism), when she/he is so sinful?* Rather, an unusually sinful person may have more need to put on white and repent than a less sinful person. This is more like a performative use of the convention of wearing white to represent purity, as opposed to its depictive use in the case of wedding gowns.

In examining these two kinds of causal relationship between representations and what they represent, I shall make use of the theory of mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985 [1994], 1997), a general framework capable of describing the full range of performative phenomena, and will also be relying on recent work on blended spaces (Fauconnier and Turner 1996, 1998, Turner and Fauconnier 1995). I shall also be making use of metaphor theory, since it is a fascinating fact that metaphorical representations (such as the use of white for purity) share this dual possibility regarding their relationship with the spaces they represent.

2. A short history of the theory of performative linguistic usage

Austin's *How to Do Things with Words* (1962) brought the word *performative* to the vocabularies of linguists and philosophers. The central nugget of Austin's perception was that there is something different or special about utterances which perform a speech act by saying explicitly *I order you, I tell you, or I request*, which sets them apart from the ones which just order, or tell, or ask by other means—as well as from other statements about non-first-person or non-present ordering, telling, or asking. I don't engage in the speech act of ordering by saying *Lucinda ordered Dennis to leave*, but *I order you all to leave* constitutes an order. Furthermore, an addressee of the former utterance can reply, *No, she didn't, you're wrong*; but the latter utterance doesn't seem susceptible to this kind of contradiction.

Austin's perception was developed most prominently by Searle (1969, 1979, 1983, 1989), who gave us a much fuller and more finely grained theory of speech acts in general, and of performativity in particular. Searle's subtler definition of performativity is more intriguing than Austin's: it centers on the issue of a special possibility, namely that of doing certain particular kinds of action specifically by (or *in*) describing doing them. Obviously this only works in certain kinds of cases. Searle develops a complex theory of the background of social facts against which it becomes possible to say *I christen you Adolphus* or *I declare you husband and wife*, and have such first-person descriptive statements constitute effective actions which change the state of the world around the speaker. But the most important thing is that it is possible: under the right

circumstances, a speaker can engage in a successful act of christening by describing herself as so doing.

As Searle points out, in this respect speech acts like christening (which requires very special social authority and circumstances) are different from ones like asking, telling, or ordering, which seem to be basic communicative actions with such general conditions that they are likely to be performed frequently by all speakers. Normally, given this understanding of speech interaction, all it takes for a speaker to perform one of these basic kinds of speech actions is to describe herself as so doing. The circumstances may not make her action felicitous, but it will still have been performed: for example, an order may be addressed to someone who does not agree that the speaker has the authority to give an order, but it will still be an order (unlike a christening by a person with no authority to christen, which according to Austin and Searle will simply not be a christening).

In short, we can always shape one specific aspect of reality by describing it, and that aspect of reality is our own speech acts. Other aspects of reality vary considerably in their receptivity to being influenced by description, as social conventions may decree. But Searle recognizes that such performative actions are not limited to first-person utterances. An umpire, with the appropriate social authority, says *That's an out* and makes it an out by saying that it is; a court official can say *This court is now in session* and thus bring the court into session, and so on. The fact of an out in baseball, or of a court being in session, are *institutional facts* (Searle 1969: ch. 2) rather than *brute facts*, and hence can be brought into being by the right socially authorized and authoritative speech act. Searle also recognizes that magical or supernatural beings are thought of as having different performative abilities from humans: they can effect not only social facts, but also things which would come under Searle's "brute fact" label. God's *Let there be light* in *Genesis* 1:3 is perhaps not Searle's best example, since its nonindicative mood removes the possibility of a purely depictive reading. However, a very clear example of the performative use of description can be found in J. R. R. Tolkien's *The Two Towers* (1954: 189), where the good wizard Gandalf breaks the traitor wizard Saruman's staff (both a symbol and an instrument of his power) by saying *Saruman, your staff is broken*, an utterance couched in a purely descriptive form.

A crucial part of the difference between descriptive and performative, then, lies in what Searle (1979: ch. 1) calls the *direction of fit* between Word and World. In descriptions, the word fits a real or imagined world. A description—or we might better say, a descriptive statement or assertion—may be true or false, depending on its fit with the world in question. On the other hand, a directive (e.g., an imperative such as *drop that!* used to convey an order) can be successful or unsuccessful, felicitous

or nonfelicitous; but it cannot be true or false, because it does not involve a fit of word to world, but rather an attempt to make the world fit the words. Imperative and subjunctive forms mark linguistic utterances as having “world to word” fit—as being (unlike depictive statements) intended to bring about a state of affairs rather than describe one.

In many respects, performative statements are more like directives than they are like descriptive statements, in that they too are attempts to make the world fit the words. But they are a rather different kind of attempt. A command or a request assumes that the world does not automatically fit itself to the speaker’s words: the addressee’s mediating action is needed, and is not guaranteed by the speech act itself, however much it may be guaranteed by other contextual factors. But a performative statement necessarily presupposes that the speaker’s statement is all that is needed to make the world fit its contents; how else can a statement be construed performatively? So it is only reasonably used where that assumption makes sense: for example, in performing a speech act (*I order you to drop that*, or *I request your explanation*), or shaping some other aspect of the situation which I have the special social authority to shape by speaking (*I christen you* spoken by the appointed ceremonial participant, *That’s an out* spoken by the umpire, and so on). This explains the “first-person” nature attributed to performatives by Austin: only first-person actions—and only speech actions, of course—can generally be performed by and in describing the performance in question, without special power to affect the world beyond the speaker.

Searle and Vanderveken (1985) labeled *declaratives* the class of statements whose truth is ensured simply by the act of uttering them under appropriate circumstances (e.g., *This meeting is now adjourned*). Crucially, such statements have both directions of fit: the words automatically fit the world, because the world has to fit the words. Searle (1989) therefore says that performatives are declaratives, and a performative such as *I order you to leave* is therefore both a statement and an order, but that the statement depends on the order, rather than the other way around. By this he means that the truth value of the statement is ensured by the automatic success of the speech act of ordering which the statement performs in describing it.⁵ For an ordinary speaker, there would be neither truth nor practical value to an attempted performative such as *I hereby end all wars*, since this is unfortunately not something whose truth can be brought about by describing it.

Now Searle further points out that other linguistic entities besides statements can be interpreted variously as to the direction of fit between word and world. In the first chapter of *Expression and Meaning* (1979: 3–4), he discusses the contrast between a shopping list and the list made up

by the detective who follows the shopper around the store and notes all the items bought. The two physical texts could be identical, but the detective's list is a description, true or false, of what was bought, while the shopping list is a self-addressed directive, telling the shopper what to buy. The shopper's actions are judged by their fit to his list (or failure to fit it), while the detective's list is intended to fit the shopper's actions; the former can thus only correct an error by returning to the store and changing his purchases, while the latter can make a correction by altering the list. The distinction between these two cases is not that of performative versus descriptive use, but is more like the contrast between a directive (the shopper's list is equivalent to a series of instructions to buy the things listed) and a statement (the detective's list is equivalent to a series of statements that the shopper bought the things listed). But the example clearly shows that, in context, an isolated word like *flour* or *butter*—without any surrounding sentence—can participate in both directions of fit.

This distinction between directions of fit translates in my analysis into the distinction between two possible directions of causal and ontological relations between two mental spaces. A statement is thought of as having an unmarked depictive function: that is, it represents an ontologically prior mental space. Performativity occurs when a form whose unmarked function is depictive is used with the opposite direction of fit, where the words bring about the described world state, and are thus ontologically and causally prior to it.

3. Mental spaces, depiction, and performativity

My very general definition of performativity is that it involves a particular relation of fit between a mental space which is a representation, and the corresponding represented space. If the representation is taken as fitting the represented space, then the relation between the spaces is *depictive* or representational. It is the success or failure of depictive fit (of the representation to the world) which is described as *true* or *false*, *accurate* or *inaccurate*. If, on the other hand, the represented space is taken as fitting (being causally influenced or changed by) the representation, then the relation is performative. The act of representation, by its performance, constitutes (or performs as a causal agent in) the structure of the represented space.

This definition does not distinguish between linguistic and nonlinguistic representations: my point will be that they can be used in remarkably similar ways.⁶ However, I inherit from Searle the crucial distinctions (1) between using a representation descriptively, and using it performatively, and (2) between performing an action by describing it (by performative use

of description) and performing it by other means. I may order you to leave by pointing to the door, or by using a linguistic form which is appropriate to the speech act of ordering (an imperative such as *Leave this room!*); both of these perform the relevant act directly, whether linguistically or not. On the other hand, I can convey the order by saying *I order you to leave the room*, which is a performative use of a descriptive form.

A nonlinguistic example to start our discussion might be that of a painting of a buffalo hunt on a cave wall, discovered by archaeologists who know from associated artifacts that the social group which produced the paintings were also buffalo hunters. In the painting, buffalo fall prey to successful hunters. A possible debate about its proper interpretation might run as follows. Was the painter chronicling a successful past hunt—is it a depictive record, following and modeling itself on events in the represented world? Or was it made with the intention of bringing about success in a future hunt—is it intended to magically bring about in reality the situation it represents? That is, is it performative, rather than depictive?

As cultural descriptions everywhere attest, we all use a wide variety of representations both depictively and performatively. Linguistic representations are only one strand (though an important and complex one) in the web of mental spaces which show such relationships.

Nonlinguistic performative examples abound in ritual and magic. Frequently the link between the depiction and the world it is intended to affect is asserted by metonymic means, as well as by purely depictive means. For example, suppose that you want to magically bring it about that I pass my exams and graduate from college. In attempting to bring this about by the performative use of purely representational means, you might paint a picture of me in graduation robes, with diploma in hand, or paste a photograph of my face into a graduation picture of this kind, to make sure that the representation resembles me. Metonymic force may be added to such a literal representation: for example, one could dress a wax doll in graduation robes, and put a lock of the actual student's hair on its head (hair, nail filings, blood, and close personal possessions are similarly used in voodoo). One might try to bring about a successful hunt by painting such a scene, or by enacting one ritually; in the latter case, one might well use metonymic links such as dressing the human actor playing the role of the hunted animal in the hide and/or horns of an animal of the same species.

Names seem to be like other representations in being susceptible to referential use for either depictive or performative purposes. In using a name to refer to a present entity or add to a depictive mental space involving a non-present entity, the kind of reference involved is like depictive reference in that it reflects already established naming practices

and makes use of them to depict some entity in some space. But two kinds of performative naming practices seem possible. One is involved in the use of names as invocations or evocations of the named entity. The Indo-European name for “bear” (the ancestor of Latin *ursus*) appears to have been lost in some Indo-European subfamilies, being replaced in Germanic by words meaning “brown one” such as *bear*, and in Slavic by words which mean “honey-eater” (e.g., Russian *m’edv’et’*). This seems to have been due to a taboo on naming certain powerful (probably totemic) animals, lest that bring them into the place where the namer is. Names of evil spirits are generally taboo, lest their use invoke the spirit’s presence.⁷ Names of gods are powerful because they may invoke the presence of the deity. The second kind of performative use of names is the metalinguistic one which establishes a naming *convention* by using a name: “baptism”, so to speak, by use of a new name. A normal depictive referential use of a name brings neither the named entity nor the naming convention into being or presence, but represents the being which is presumed to exist, and follows the presumed naming convention to do so.

4. Ritual and performativity

A particularly interesting fact about the dual nature of representations discussed above is that it holds true of metaphorical representations as well as of literal ones. For example, George Lakoff tells me that in some Italian village communities, it used to be the custom to carry a newly born infant up a flight of stairs as soon as possible after birth, so that the child might socially “rise in the world” in later life. The metaphorical mapping seems clear: STATUS IS UP (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980), and hence GAINING STATUS IS RISING. But unlike most metaphors, it is not metaphorically describing an extant or possible situation, but attempting to influence a future state of affairs. By changing relations in the source domain (height), the relations in the target domain (status) are to be changed.

Metonymic relations are similarly capable of being used either depictively or performatively. A metonymic ritual which parallels the “Baby and the Stairs” ritual just mentioned would be the rather common European and American practice of feeding a baby with a silver spoon, metonymically invoking the frame of prosperity. The phrase *born with a silver spoon in his mouth* seems hard to imagine as a literal description, but silver baby spoons try to make it—and the wealth with which it is metonymically associated—come true.

Metonymic performative use of names is possible as well; we just mentioned the traditional belief that even purely referentially-intended mention of a powerful entity evokes the presence of that entity. Perhaps

a stronger example of metonymic name use occurs in a Jewish Purim ritual. At Purim, the religious holiday when Jews read the *Book of Esther*, some observant Jews write the Hebrew characters for the name *Amalek* on the soles of their shoes in chalk, and allow it to be erased by their walking. The holiday commemorates Esther's saving of the Jewish people, by foiling the plot of Haman, King Ahasuerus' evil counsellor. Haman was a member of the tribe called Amalekites. And one traditional rabbinic instruction for celebrating Purim says that Jews should "remember to forget (or obliterate) the name of Amalek"—that is, Haman should be doomed to oblivion, but ironically one must remember him to make sure he is forgotten. He, or the memory of him, is metonymically obliterated by erasing or destroying a written copy of his name. Similar magical uses apparently prevailed in late classical Europe, judging by the finding of pierced and torn lead foil tablets, with victims' names written on them, often in the same places with tablets which bear written curses; these tablets were dropped into wells as a way of conveying them to the underworld deities who might be able to carry out their harmful intents.

Metaphorical and metonymic representations, then, can be used either depictively or performatively, just like literal representations. A metaphorical mapping automatically brings two mental spaces into play, the source and target domains. Further, one of these (the source domain) is the space of the representation, and the other (the target) is the space of the represented world. For instance, in saying *clear-sighted* or *sharp-eyed* to refer to a person's social or intellectual perceptions rather than to their physical vision, the thing being represented is the social or intellectual perceptiveness, and the representation of it is the description of physical vision. (This description is itself a representation, of course; so the metaphorical use is a secondary representational use of it.) The possibility then exists of "fit" in either direction between these two spaces. In Ursula Le Guin's *A Wizard of Earthsea* (1968), the central character is named Sparrowhawk originally by metonymic association (as a young magic-worker he loves to summon animals magically and is especially often seen with hawks); other characters, such as his first teacher, clearly think the name is a good metaphorical description of his intellectual speed and power, and his fiercely independent character. Both of these are depictive uses, since the name is supposed to metonymically describe him as he independently is, or metaphorically depict his independently determined nature. He names his boat *Lookfar*, and paints eyes on its prow: this can only be metaphorical, since the boat cannot literally see, but it is also performative rather than depictive, since it is intended to *give* the boat some of the protection that comes from careful (*far-sighted*) physical observance and mental consideration of the environment.⁸

Much religious ritual seems to be both metaphorical and performative in this sense. The circular shape of a ring metaphorically represents the unending permanence of marriage; but its use in a wedding ceremony is to bring that permanence into social being, not just to describe it. The ring's status as performative, not simply depictive, is confirmed by many wearers' superstitions about taking off or losing their wedding rings. We cited earlier the white dress worn by many Christians as metaphorically depicting (truly or not) the bride's virgin status; in support of this depictive reading we noted the convention barring the wearing of a white dress at a woman's second marriage ceremony, on the grounds that it is a misrepresentation. However, we also mentioned the white ritual garments worn for purification (by penitents in both Jewish and Christian traditions) as a performative usage of the same metaphoric mapping: being intended to help *bring about* purity, they metaphorically refer to the desired spiritual end-state of the rituals in which they participate, not the factual initial state.

Indeed, the same representation in ritual may apparently be simultaneously depictive and performative. Does kneeling to a divinity metaphorically represent the already extant differential in power and status between worshipper and god (a depictive use), or help to bring the worshipper into the right state of humility (a performative use)? Perhaps both. A Christian communion service may likewise be seen as metaphorically depicting, in the physical uniting of the blessed bread and wine (metaphorically representing Christ's body and blood) with the bodies of the worshippers, an already extant spiritual union between human and divine; but it certainly must also be seen as intending to causally bring about this spiritual union via the consumption of the bread and wine.⁹

Perhaps ontological religious ritual, such as the communion service, is especially certain to be simultaneously depictive and performative, since it both acknowledges (or affirms) a particular ontology as prevailing, and is also intended to assist in maintaining it, or keeping it in being. The apparently traditional Celtic ritual marriage of the king to the land, thought to have been manifested metaphorically in a ritual act of sexual union with his spouse, has been interpreted as both acknowledging and perpetuating the special link of that king and his people to that territory.¹⁰ Jewish and Christian (following Jewish texts) ritual words which claim to bless, glorify (i.e., "make glorious"), or magnify (i.e., "make great") God by saying *You are blessed, you are glorious, or you are great*, are now analyzed as depictives where worshippers acknowledge God's blessedness, glory, and greatness. But there is evidence in older Mediterranean traditions, including Indo-European ones, of a more

performative interpretation, where gods depended on worshippers for greatness (and were thus literally made glorious or great by worshippers' depictions in hymns such as those of the Vedas, the Avestas, or the Homeric hymns), even while worshippers depended on gods for powerful supernatural protection and support enabled by that same greatness.

The crucial points here are that metaphorical as well as literal description can be used either depictively or performatively (as claimed in the introduction), and that ritual often involves both metaphorical and literal representation, which may be used depictively, performatively, or both depictively and performatively. An added point of interest is that the relevant representation in ritual can be linguistic or nonlinguistic: it takes place via visual symbols like color of garments, physical objects such as bread and wine, and actions such as eating or kneeling, as well as via linguistic representations in the spoken text of the liturgy. Table 1 provides a summary.

We should note that not only “ritual”, but also everyday interaction has the characteristics we have just been mentioning. Bickel (1997, 2000), analyzing Belhare culture, chronicles its pervasive metaphorical mappings of the source domain of UP/DOWN onto target domains such as STATUS (UP is positive status, DOWN is relative lack of such status), LIFE/DEATH (UP is ALIVE, DOWN is DEAD), and GODS/HUMANS. In Belhara, a grandchild would have to pass a grandparent on the downhill side of the path, leaving the uphill side to the respected elder; a loom is placed facing uphill to weave garments for living wearers but downhill to weave a shroud; temples are built on local heights, and the leaves of food sacrifices to the gods should face uphill. What Bickel brings out is the complex unity between what Westerners would regard as “everyday” activities, such as the fact of loom placement in a house, or the right way to pass your grandmother on a hillside path, and “ritual” activities such as worship at a temple. Likewise, Western customs of bowing and kneeling (to monarchs for instance) are not limited to religious ritual, and sometimes seem in broader contexts to have the same ambiguity as to their performative or depictive status: does kneeling before a monarch acknowledge, or help to maintain his or her rule as monarch?¹¹

“Personal ritual” in everyday life in Western cultures has many of the same characteristics of more culturally shared rituals.¹² Metonymic personal good luck charms abound in Western cultural contexts. Often it seems that wearing a “lucky” piece of clothing or jewelry is intended to bring about success associated with the item earlier: a baseball player who pitched a no-hitter wearing a particular hat or socks may insist on wearing the “lucky” hat or socks in future important games. The lucky

Table 1. *Classes of uses of representations*

	Depictive	Performative
Nonlinguistic		
literal	ordinary portrait; enactment intended to portray literally: e.g., commemorative reenactment of hunt.	Dorian Gray's portrait; enactment intended to influence events: e.g. ritual hunt to bring about future success in hunting.
metaphorical	wearing white at a wedding.	wearing white as a penitent.
metonymic	picture of high-heeled shoe on women's rest room door.	use of lock of hair to make voodoo doll effective.
Linguistic		
literal	description of speech act in order to portray it: "He promised me to come on time." description of social fact in order to portray it: "it's out" said by a fan.	description of speech act in order to perform it: "I promise you to come on time." description of social fact in order to create it: "it's out" said by an umpire.
metaphorical	metaphorical descriptions used to portray: prices SOARED, FAR-SIGHTED policy, GLASS CEILING, etc.	metaphorical ritual formulae intended to change the world: "This is my body" in the ritual of the Eucharist.
metonymic	metonymic descriptions used to portray: HAND = "worker".	metonymic formulae intended to change the world: saying names to invoke the named entity is a frame-metonymic evocation of the situation of addressing a present entity.

item metonymically evokes the past success frame, so wearing it in a subsequent game blends the past successful frame with the ongoing, still-uncertain game situation, with the causal direction of the blend being clearly performative. Another reason why an item may be linked with success is an association with a successful previous owner. For example, a rookie baseball player might possess a hat or a bat once owned by a great player. In this case, wearing or using the lucky item would be intended to blend the great player's past successes with the rookie's actual game situations, again with performative intent to create similar success for the rookie.

Personal “luck” tokens which are not so obviously related to professional activity can also be understood in a similar way. A linguist who uses, let’s say, Roman Jakobson’s pocket watch as a “lucky charm” when presenting conference papers, is presumably doing much the same thing as the baseball rookie wearing the role model’s hat. But a linguist or a baseball player may also attribute “lucky” qualities to an item which is a gift from some special person, a parent or spouse or lover. Supposing that the donor is not a member of the relevant professional community, and the item has no metonymic association with success in the relevant field except what the current wearer can bring to it, why would someone wear such a gift to ensure luck in professional performance? The answer, of course, is that it is a source of moral support, but why? A blended spaces analysis would argue that the linguist, or the baseball player, is indeed evoking a second space to blend with that of the professional performance: the social space of his or her relationship with the donor. We might suppose that well-paired couples, or loving parents and children, tend to feel happy and strong and confident with each other, and feel involved in mutually supportive social interaction. A spouse’s presence in the audience at a professional event might also blend the two spaces, and help the “on-stage” professional to feel confident and to experience the professional environment as supportive. The object given by the spouse or lover or parent is intended to accomplish the same task, by metonymically evoking the space of the relationship, and blending the associated feelings of success and confidence with the professional performance setting.

These “lucky” item traditions are not mutually exclusive: perhaps the most powerful kind of professional lucky charm is one which combines them. For example, imagine a linguist whose beloved teacher, or parent, was a famous linguist. Now suppose that the young linguist carried the much-loved mentor’s pocket-watch to bring success in conference presentations. Two of the kinds of blending input discussed above would then be in force; and if the young linguist also came to associate the pocket-watch with his or her own successes, there would be yet a third source of “power” to the lucky charm.

Having come so far, it seems necessary to relate this account of performative ritual structures to some of the anthropological understandings of magic and ritual. Any sufficient theory of these domains should be able to offer insight into the motivated relationships between ritual activities and their intended effects. Past anthropological theories have indeed given some of these insights, although their helpfulness is unfortunately obscured by a language which is often alien to modern scholarship. For example, “magic” and “superstition” tend in earlier

Western anthropological and folklore literature to refer to the beliefs and activities of people who are less educated or of non-European cultures, while “religion” refers to the beliefs and activities of “advanced” cultures.¹³ Setting this aside, the activities labeled as “magic” are clearly intended to have a causal effect on the world, often via verbal and non-verbal representations used in the manner we have discussed.

An extensive literature on magic and ritual cannot all be covered here. However, many past analysts have noticed that magic is based on “contiguity” with the supposed causal effecting agencies or the affected entities, and on “similarity” or “analogy” to them.¹⁴ Mauss (1950[1972]) resumes past work by reference to the laws of *contiguity*, *similarity*, and *opposition*. Anthropologists have agreed that the contiguity-based (“contagion”) kind of magic is essentially metonymic, and the “similarity” kind is metaphorical or analogical. The structuralist enterprise in cultural analysis depends crucially on the hypothesis that not only magic but *culture* (and hence magic) inherently involves systemic “parallels” or structural analogies between disparate domains, which are understood as having causal relations to each other. The work of scholars like Turner (1967) or Levi-Strauss (1966[1962]) consists of constant constructions of analogical mappings, which are used to explain the relevant culture’s causal and ontological theories, including those on which performative ritual usages are based.

In general, anthropological analysis has proceeded without a very precise definition of analogy, metaphor, or similarity. A metaphor analyst would be inclined to say that some “similarity-based” magic is based on literal similarity of color, shape, and so on, while there is also real metaphorical magic as well. Evans-Pritchard’s (1937) study of Azande witchcraft and magic describes, for example, a cure for leprosy which used the bark of a tree which looks like the patchy appearing skin of the early stages of leprosy (1937: 450), and rituals for keeping rain from falling by suspending a stone, or by sending smoke upwards (1937: 472–474) in order suspend or reverse the direction of the falling water. The leprosy treatment seems more similarity based in the direct sense, while the anti-rain magic is more analogical or metaphorical. The leprosy treatment is also contiguity based (hence metonymic) if the bark is brought into contact with the body of the person to be cured. In recent work, Sørensen (1997, 2000) offers a very neat analysis of metaphorical magical structures, showing how mappings can be laid out between source and target domains in many cases, thus making a link between traditional analyses and modern metaphor theory.¹⁵

Anthropologists have insisted that magic is based on the community’s belief in the efficacy of the practices involved (cf. Evans-Pritchard 1937;

Mauss 1950; Firth 1954; Malinowski 1965; and many more). They have highlighted the importance of magical words in many or most traditions. Tambiah (1985) resumes much of these understandings with a general claim that magic is “performative” in Austin’s sense. By this he means that magical activities, including verbal formulae, are intended to affect the world around them: he does not apparently mean the word to refer precisely to the use of *representations* in my Searlean manner.

A mental spaces analysis of ritual and magic gives a unified analysis of the structures of the beliefs which permit magic to be seen as efficacious. It offers a way to take the metaphorical and metonymic links which seem to be the basis for much of magic and ritual, and to incorporate them into a theory of cognitive structure. Since cognition at large is structured in terms of spaces and mappings, mental spaces offers a ready formalism for the kinds of cross-domain relationships (based on perceptions of parallelism) which are dealt with by structuralist analysis of culture. If we add to this the Searlean concept of performativity—in the sense of the use of a representation to affect the represented space—then we can bring together our theories of metaphor and of mental spaces with Searle’s speech act theory, to develop a new general theory of performativity which goes beyond speech acts. This theory, it seems to me, has great potential for incorporating past insights into magic and ritual and unifying them with our understanding of everyday cultural cognition and language.

5. The mental space structures involved in performative and depictive usages

Let us first look at the blended spaces involved in the earlier hypothetical example of a ritual dance which enacts a successful buffalo hunting scenario in order to bring about success in an intended future real hunt. Figure 1 shows the complex blend involved in the performative example. We have a blend between (Input 1) the ritual setting and participants and (Input 2) a hunting scene and its participants. In the ritual setting, we have a real space¹⁶ containing people chasing other people, with weapons. This pursuit is not interpreted as hostility within Input 1, so not all of the accessible knowledge about these people and weapons is brought into the ritual interaction input space, although some things (such as who is known to be a good hunter in real life) may be brought in. Likewise, in the input to the hunting scenario, there must be knowledge of the speed at which a buffalo runs, and how strong and heavy a buffalo is. Some of this is going to be left out of the structure of the hunting scenario which constitutes Input 2: ritual hunters will probably not assume that they need to run fast enough to chase a real buffalo, for example, or that they




Figure 1.

will need to remove and cure the (perhaps already cured) buffalo hides worn by the buffalo-enactors. The blend is the effective understanding of what the ritual *is*, for the participants: that is, for them the person enacting the part of the buffalo is a buffalo, and the people enacting the roles of hunters are the human participants in the relevant future hunting expedition. This blend may be strengthened in various ways: for example, the ritual hunters may be the same people who intend to participate in the planned expedition, and may wear their actual hunting gear, giving identity links between the two input spaces. The buffalo-enactors may wear buffalo skins, creating metonymic links of a different kind between the two spaces, even though these are not the hides of the hunter's actual future quarry.

As Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner have pointed out to me, however, there is an added complexity in this hunting ritual blend, which

we have not discussed. In a performative speech act, the description and the performance are not only blended, they are simultaneously enacted, in a single action over a single time period. If I say *I promise to be there*, I have described my act of promising and thereby performed a promise, via the physical act of pronouncing one phrase. But many rituals are not as temporally simple as that. In this case, the entire time span of Input 2 is yet to happen, still in the ritual participants' anticipatory imaginations, while the physical pursuit of humans by other humans in Input 1 is happening in the time frame of the ritual performance. Further, presumably the actual hunt will *not* in fact be a blend of this kind: that is, when the hunters on the intended expedition actually kill a buffalo, they will not be cognitively blending this space with that of the human-hunting-human ritual activity. Here, in the blended space set up by the ritual, the perhaps much shorter time-span of the ritual is mapped onto the longer time-span of an imagined actual hunt; and, assuming that many buffalo might be killed in an important hunting expedition, the catching and "killing" of the fewer human ritual enactors of the buffalo role stands for the intended hunting and killing of many more real buffalo. *Compression* (cf. Fauconnier and Turner 2000) on multiple dimensions makes it possible to conduct this ritual without taking all the time needed for a real hunt, and even without knowing how long the actual hunt will last or how many buffalo will be killed.

Via this compressed mapping onto the Input 1 space, Input 2 is causally influenced. The ritual hunters' success in chasing down the enactor of the ritual buffalo role causally brings about success in the future hunting expedition, because in the blend it *constitutes* success in the future expedition. This is of course a simplified analysis: in a full treatment, one would also, for example, treat the input from *past* experience of hunting expeditions, which shapes the ritual participants' concept of the future hunting expedition, before it can come into existence and set up Input 2. The blends involved become more and more complex.

Let us now compare the hunting example, which is mostly literal and metonymic in its means of depiction, with a metaphorical ritual blended space example, that of the baby being carried upstairs to ensure her future success in the world. In order to believe in this ritual, one needs to believe that in depicting a source-domain situation (MOVING UPWARDS), one can bring about a result in the target domain which is metaphorically being conveyed via this depiction (IMPROVEMENT IN SOCIAL STATUS).

One way of looking at metaphor is to think of it as a special "one-sided" blend of mental spaces, specifically a blend wherein the structure of the source-domain input space is used to restructure or add structure to that of the target-domain input space, but the basic internal structure of

the blended space is primarily determined by the target domain. By this analysis, a literal use minimally involves two spaces, that of the representation and that of the represented situation. But metaphorical usage minimally involves two input spaces in the representation, as well as the spaces represented by each of those representations. Thus, *she's rising* used metaphorically to mean that she is gaining status involves (1) a source-domain depiction of physical rising, which represents some space wherein physical rising occurs and (2) a target-domain depiction of gain in status, which represents some space wherein status is gained. Via metaphorical one-sided mapping from source depiction to target depiction, a blend is created, and we understand the utterance to refer to a gain in status understood in terms of physical rising.

Metaphorical performative uses do not pose any particular problems. In a metaphorical depictive use, it is understood that the blend is a new way of construing the representation of the *target* space, not the source space; and likewise in a metaphorical performative use, it is understood that the target space is the one to be affected by the performative. The more relevant space for the *representation* part of the performative, then, is the source domain; and the target domain is taken as crucially connected to the represented and affected space.

Figure 2 shows a partial mental spaces analysis of the ritual of carrying the baby upstairs to ensure her improvement in status during her life. In this figure, Input 1 is the understanding of this particular act of carrying the baby upstairs: this brings in material from everyday stair-climbing, including being carried and the causal role of the carrier. Input 2 is the child's life: this brings in anything we know about life-directions, including parental influence. The blend is the child's life direction AS going upstairs. Finally, the generic space is some very abstract scalar structure, with a positive and negative pole to the scale (since both verticality and status seem to have scalar inference structures and +/– poles).

There is compression of structure, again: the baby's whole life corresponds to the much shorter whole trip upstairs. Pressure from the blend, including pressure from compression, influences how the two input spaces actually structure the resources from the cognitive domains which ultimately provide their material. For example, in an ordinary trip upstairs carrying a baby, one might stumble or fall, and that would be unimportant as long as neither the carrier nor the baby were physically injured. But it might well be an extremely bad omen to stumble or fall in this ritual stair-climbing activity: this is because the baby's entire metaphorical "life journey" is represented by these few moments of stair-climbing. A single tumble on a short flight of stairs takes up a large portion of time—and of




Figure 2. (To keep the figure legible, only selected connections have been drawn.)

the watchers' attention—relative to the time and attention spent on the stair-climb as a whole. The importance of the tumble relative to the stair-climbing (*not* relative to the participants' whole lives) is mapped onto the importance of some misfortune relative to the baby's entire life. Similarly, one could not decide in the middle of the ritual that one had forgotten the baby's bottle downstairs, and go down again to fetch it (an activity presumably not mapped by the ritual). Once the ritual "clock" is started, the stair-climbing activity must be continuous from beginning to end, just as the baby's life will be continuous from start to finish.

As in the hunting ritual, in the blended space of the ritual the movement upwards causes the future improvement in social status, because it constitutes it. In order to believe in the efficacy of either of these rituals, one has to believe that one can causally bring about a good hunt by (or in) enacting it, and that one can causally bring about improvement in social status by enacting something which is metaphorically mapped onto it.

6. “Thinking makes it so”

By this analysis, performative causal force is generally dependent on the beliefs of the people making and interpreting the representations which are taken as being used performatively. One set of parents might see the “Baby and the Stairs” ritual as having, if successfully carried out, already causally set the “upwards” socioeconomic trajectory of their child’s life; while another might see the ritual as simply an *attempt* to make such an improvement in status occur. To the second set, the “Baby and the Stairs” ritual is only an attempt at the performative use of a description. We must still see performativity here, since the whole point of the depictive metaphorical portrayal is to bring about the changes in the world which are metaphorically depicted—and to bring it about by the depiction, rather than by other means, even if it is not viewed as necessarily successful.

These are not minor issues. One of the most basic differences between Catholic and Protestant theology is that Catholicism holds that the Eucharistic bread (host) and wine are really transformed into Christ’s body in each performance of the Mass, while most Protestant denominations hold instead that the Eucharist is a “memorial” service, and the bread represents Christ’s body, but is not the Real Presence. One might simplistically but insightfully summarize this as a disagreement about the status of the blend created by the eucharistic rite. Both groups see the Eucharist as performative in that it brings about union with God via a metaphorical blend with the real space consumption of bread and wine. However, the Catholics differ from the Protestants with respect to the causal nature of the consecration part of the ritual: they see *This is my body* and *This is my blood* as being performative, while the Protestants see these phrases as metaphorically depictive.

Are there linguistic “attempted” performatives, then? It seems clear that there are. First of all, there are cases where—contrary to Austin’s original simpler claims—there may be real disagreement or uncertainty about the social authority which gives causal shaping ability to a particular speaker. Austin may be correct that nobody will ever think a marriage formula pronounced over a human and a monkey will “count” or “take effect”. But the negotiability of the authority of the formulaic speech acts involved in marriage is clear from the current lively social debate as to whether same-sex marriage is possible. Positions run the gamut from those who simply see heterosexuality as the essential cornerstone of the concept of marriage (in which case, same-sex marriages are simply causally inefficacious and nonsensical), to those who see heterosexuality as a socially imposed standard on marriage, which has little to do

with the essential idea of marriage as a relationship (in which case same-sex marriages are perfectly possible, and verbal formulae of marriage are causally efficacious for same-sex couples).¹⁷ An even simpler case is that of marriages recognized by civil authorities but not by religious ones: for example, civil marriages of Catholics who have only received a civil divorce and not a religious annulment of the first marriage; or Reform Jewish marriages between a Jew and a Reform convert to Judaism, which will not be recognized by Orthodox Jewish rabbinical authorities.

The possibility of “attempted” performative uses of description puts these performatives on a par with other kinds of nonperformative speech acts—unlike *I promise you*, or *I ask you*, or *I order you*, which always constitute a genuine promise or question or order, *With this ring I thee wed* may not always succeed in its causal goal of constituting a genuine marriage vow. Where such acts differ from nonperformatives is that their causal force—successful or not—is still carried out via apparently descriptive forms. This is unlike *Please finish your spinach!* or *Where is Chris?* Direct speech acts of this kind may not be causally successful in their perlocutionary goals of influencing the hearer’s actions, but do succeed in their illocutionary goals of directing and querying just as inevitably as their performative counterparts; however, they succeed by nondescriptive means. Their grammatical forms do the work that performative description of the speaker’s action could also do.

Another class of linguistic forms which might be treated as part of this class of attempted performatives—performatives whose success is not assured by the performance itself—is non-first-person descriptions of future events which are intended as directives. *You will proceed directly to the rendezvous point*, or *Jones will remain here, and Smith will proceed to the rendezvous point*, said by a superior officer to soldiers Jones and Smith, might constitute a command. If so, it constitutes a command via the power of description, rather than via the direct use of imperative forms. The presumption that one can describe someone else’s future actions may, in the right context, in itself indicate the belief that one has sufficient social authority to cause those actions. If that belief is shared by hearers, then a description may indeed have causal force in this way.¹⁸

There is a fascinating complementarity between first-person linguistic performatives, which are centrally present tense (performed in and via the description of one’s own speech act, for example), and second- and third-person ones, which are future and are not centrally about speech acts. This follows readily from the observation that through speech one can causally influence one’s own present actions—especially speech actions—but only the future actions of others. And this in turn

provides the solution to the paradox proposed by cultural theory, in particular by analyses such as Butler's (1990, 1993), which treat all descriptive speeches as performatives, which are effectual only through the "citation" of past ones.

Indeed, every linguistic categorization I make is an act justified by its predecessors, and contributing to the viability of its successors; each use of the word *stone* or *cat*, as well as *woman* or *man*, has this characteristic. And further, it is my authority as a native speaker of a relatively high-prestige dialect of English which may make my labeling practices potentially citable, as it was in part the social authority of past users which makes me cite their uses. However, there are evident reasons why cultural theory has focused on words like *woman* rather than on ones like *stone* or *cat*. The concepts of femininity and femaleness are far more socially constructed than felinity or stoneness, and not coincidentally they are also far more contested. Labeling me a woman may bring with it the knowledge that the labeler is imposing on me his or her understanding of femininity, which may not be mine. This kind of conflict is less likely in less socially constructed areas. I may say "tomahto" and you may try to impose your pronunciation on me, but in our discussion there is no disagreement about what a tomato is, nor will we have a changed tomatohood depending on who wins. Or we may debate about the categories *fruit* and *vegetable*, again without much real disagreement about the entities, only about their mapping onto labels.

Critical theory uses of the word *performative* seem to have generalized the term to refer to almost any kind of action which influences social construal of a situation or a person. Part of the reason for this seems to be their questioning of the boundaries between depiction and performativity in social construction. For example, we might say that many of us have a folk theory that when I wear certain clothes, that fits my independently extant gender identity, while if I wore other clothes, that would be an attempt to create some alternative gender identity. The difference between stage costume and "cross dressing", by this analysis, is that the one sets up the alternate gender identity only in the world of the play, while cross dressing may attempt to establish it in the real world. A critical theorist might reply to all of this that in fact my gender identity is anything but "independently extant"—it is precisely in doing all the things which I do (such as wearing gender-appropriate clothing) that I continuously enact my gender identity. Of course, this is not done in isolation, but as part of a complex and inescapable web of social conventions, which can be quite coercive. But nonetheless, in this understanding, all of the uses of gender markers are "performative"—they all construct gender identity, constantly.

The same might be said, in this view, of other “depictive” uses: little of the social world, or even of our understanding of the physical world, can be taken for granted as independent of our ongoing construal. Whenever I speak, dress, or otherwise behave in a way appropriate to my society’s ideas of feminine gender, I not only acknowledge my membership in that category, but participate in the creation and maintenance of that membership. And when I describe myself or other people according to socially accepted gender categories, I am likewise participating in the creation and maintenance of those categorizations. This presumably goes beyond the usual discussions of gender and social-group identity, although where it stops is unclear. If I sustain bookhood, or cathood, as a category by recognizing it and using it (thinking I am using it depictively), what am I creating or maintaining? Presumably my human cognitive categories, but to what extent is that an imposition, as opposed to a recognition of agreed-on categories? Any linguist would agree that uncontested human categorization is maintained and strengthened by use of those categories; but that still seems different from causal action to bring such structure into being. In the case of one’s own social identity, it seems obvious that one can causally affect that identity by one’s own actions; in the case of my categorization of something as a cat or a (non-)cat, it seems less evident that I can do much that matters by such activity. At any rate, I will be likely to affect *only* my own categorization system, or at most labeling conventions rather than people’s actual understanding of the entity in question. Crucially, I will be most unlikely to affect the situation described: whether a cat is present or not, my mention of the label will not change that presence or absence.

It is otherwise with femininity, or ethnic identity: these concepts are so cognitively constructed, so far from our collective bootstrapping mechanisms of embodiment, that being categorized as an A or a B is essential to “being” an A or a B. Under most everyday circumstances, such categories have a different kind of causal character from categories which are more directly based in perception and bodily experience. Taking categories from both ends of the cline, it will appear that at one end of the cline, even performative use of category labels is “only” a debate about labeling, while at the other end of the cline any use is an imposition of social construal on the labeled situation.

But even in the more heavily constructed cases, the power of labeling and description is quite limited, when closely examined. It seems unhelpful, therefore, to abandon the original distinction between performative and depictive. I may be engaging in an act of construal, or even social construction, when I describe someone else’s speech act (*she asked me when I had come home*); but I cannot be trying to perform the described

speech act, or to make it the case that it was performed, as I could via *I ask you when you came home*. Describing real or imagined states of affairs (past successful hunts), although it surely involves conceptual construal and social presentation of those descriptions, is not the same as using descriptions to try to causally influence the future hunt's success.

Gender theorists in particular have also used *performativity* to refer to the power to perform speech acts; *gay performativity* apparently refers to the gay community's empowerment to speak of and for itself, rather than remaining silent or silenced (Sedgwick 1993; Livia and Hall 1997). Again, this would not have been Searle's or Austin's usage of the word. But Austin and Searle are assuming that performance of speech acts such as statements, questions, even orders, requires no special conditions beyond very general ones. There is certainly nothing in their understanding of performativity which would be special or inaccessible to the gay and lesbian communities: we know that gay, lesbian, bisexual and transsexual English speakers are as linguistically competent to make statements, ask questions, and give commands as straight speakers are—and also as competent to represent such speech acts, both for performative and depictive purposes. The real issue which gender theory exposes, for Austin and Searle's understanding of speech acts, is the problematic nature of institutional or social facts, which most speech act theorists appear to take as somehow “given” by a shared social framework. Chen (1999) suggests that Austin was wrong: a christening carried out by an unauthorized person need not automatically be a simple failure—it could instead be a disputed case, understood by some people as having carried out a christening and by others as having failed. Same-sex marriage ceremonies offer the same possibility of disputed construal.

Social categories are often labeled, and labels are often used to confer and negotiate membership in social categories (e.g., *marriage, husband, wife*). Particular formal institutional authority may be built up to confirm such membership, with attendant ceremonies, which are likely to make declarative use of statements using the labels in question (*You are now husband and wife*). Inasmuch as some groups' chosen categories are not institutionally canonized in this way, they are prevented from engaging in certain kinds of important performative activities: US law does not recognize the possibility of marriage for same-sex couples.

Gay performativity, therefore, is not a special kind of performativity, but a claiming of social authority to participate in shaping institutional facts, and thus to make performative uses of descriptions “take” in ways which would not have been authorized without social recognition of the categories involved. Austin and Searle would doubtless say that this is beyond their immediate purview, and indeed that it has nothing to say to

their work: they always said that declaratives were dependent on institutional facts. The gender theorists' insight seems to be that—like speech acts—institutional facts themselves exist only by our representation of them: act as if they are altered (or *enact* them differently), and in some sense they really are. Mental space analysis of some of these social phenomena seems like a fruitful field of endeavor.

7. Conclusions

A complex web of mappings shape our uses of the cognitive relationship between represented and representing spaces. Central to this web of mappings is the issue of the causal relationship between a representation and what it represents. As all past research agrees, all speakers can causally bring about their own speech acts by describing them. Cultural differences in socially granted causal authorities may differ and cause corresponding differences in performative powers, as in the special authority granted to umpires to make a ball an out by stating that it is so, or to priests or judges to make two people legally married by stating that it is so. Cultural and personal differences in beliefs about causation will likewise influence the performative use of mental spaces: why would one take communion, for example, unless one believed in its efficacy?

In looking at the special status of language in this web of mappings, linguists and philosophers of language have paid less attention to the web as a whole, and to the similarities between the ways in which linguistic and nonlinguistic forms of representation can be used both depictively and performatively. I would like to take a moment here to consider the special status of *nonlinguistic* representation, and why it is so important in ritual. There is a general understanding that words may represent falsely as well as truly. The sentence *Joe may go to Cairo* is specifically marked as not representing reality, but even *Joe went to Cairo* could turn out to be inaccurate. Pictures, of course, need not represent real “originals”, but it seems to me that we are inclined to think that they do. In reading a sentence about a boat in a novel, are we as likely to wonder about the writer's “original” as we might do in looking at an illustration of the same sentence? And as for enactment, well, *actions speak louder than words*, as they say: that is, actions show the reality of someone's intentions and behavior, while words may not. Ritual blends are cognitively strengthened, not only by multimodal involvement of the participants, but by the added realism gained from that involvement.

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Notes

1. In some states of the US, a couple can become legally married in common law if they represent themselves as married; if one of them introduces the other to acquaintances as *my husband*, or *my wife*, a divorce may be necessary to part them subsequently, should someone choose to treat this seriously.
2. And indeed, could also be a description of a habitual or iterative pattern of promising. The oddity is that—contrary to the usual interpretation of simple presents of perfective verbs in English—it is not restricted to this iterative/habitual reading. See Langacker (1991: chap. 3) for an insightful discussion of the aspectual issue here.
3. I will touch only very lightly on other senses of the word.
4. Most notably Austin (1962) and Searle (1969, 1979, 1983, 1989).
5. Note that of course Searle does not mean that the order will automatically succeed in inducing the perlocutionary effect of compliance, but only that it will automatically succeed in communicating the illocutionary force of an order.
6. Here I follow closely on Grice, who insisted very strongly on the unity between speech acts and other kinds of action, stating explicitly (Grice 1975) that the Maxim of Quality is really a sub-case of the kind of norm which makes us expect to be handed sugar (and not salt in a sugar-bowl) when we ask for sugar.
7. Modern fiction writers also make use of this convention; Diana Wynne Jones has a series of novels involving a wizard whose name (or title) is Chrestomanci, and who is generally obliged to appear whenever and wherever he is mentioned. (He has an impressively elegant collection of dressing gowns so as not to be caught at too much of a disadvantage when summoned at less opportune moments.)
8. Sparrowhawk pays for the boat by magically curing the cataracts of the old man who owns it; the old man suggests that he name the boat Lookfar and thus give it metaphorical “vision” in repayment for the old man’s restored literal vision. And indeed, in later interactions, the boat sometimes seems to be magically aware of the hero’s intentions, as well as of weather. (See *A Wizard of Earthsea* by Ursula K. LeGuin [1968].)
9. The Episcopalian communion service, for example, contains such central phrases as the quasi-directives, said to communicants as the bread and wine are presented to them, *The Body of our Lord Jesus Christ keep you in everlasting life* and *The Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ keep you in everlasting life* (*The Book of Common Prayer* [1977, The Seabury Press, NY], p. 365) which clearly indicate that the bread and wine are intended to causally bring about a particular spiritual situation, and not merely to attest to its existence.
10. Cf. Mac Cana (1970), 94ff, 120ff.
11. It is unclear to me whether critical theory would answer this question with *Neither* or *Both*. All social roles are considered as performance, in a mutually interdependent context; but they are also not considered as agentive or voluntary performance by individual agents. Rather, as I understand it, the State performs via us the roles which it coercively bequeaths to us. So, despite the use of the term performativity to describe this situation, there is no real distinction between performativity and depiction in this understanding of social structure. (Butler 1990, 1993; Sedgwick 1993)
12. Thanks to Marco Casonato for drawing my attention to this area.
13. Though nearly all analysts have problems with these labels: see Durkheim’s (1915) discussion, pp. 58ff; he ends up arguing for the use of the term *religion* for shared communal ritual enterprises which set out to affect the world, and *magic* for individual ones.

14. Also called *sympathetic* magic, e.g., in Frazer's (1890) *The Golden Bough*.
15. I should thank Jesper Sørensen for his input into earlier stages of this paper, as well as for letting me have input into his ongoing work.
16. In the sense of Scott Liddell ([1998] and generally in his work).
17. Note that the first women Episcopal priests to be ordained, in the 1970s, were ordained in a ritually correct ceremony—all the right linguistic and ritual forms, performed by duly ordained (male) bishops who had the Anglican Church's authority to ordain priests. The Church eventually accepted the ordination of women as a result; but the initial official response was that these ordinations were "valid but irregular".
18. I would like to thank Agata Kochanska for bringing these parallels to my attention.

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